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A long tradition in economics explores the association between the quality of formal 
institutions and economic performance. The literature on the relationship between such 
institutions and happiness is, however, rather limited, and inconclusive. In this paper, 
we revisit the findings from recent cross-country studies on the institutions-happiness 
association.  Our  findings  suggest  that  their  conclusions  are  qualitatively  rather 
insensitive to the specific measure of ‘happiness’ used, while the associations between 
formal  institutions  and  subjective  well-being  differ  among  poor  and  rich  countries. 
Separating different types of institutional quality, we find that in developing countries 
the effects of economic-judicial institutions on happiness dominate those of political 
institutions, while analyses restricted to middle- and high-income countries show strong 
support  for  an  additional  beneficial  effect  of  political  institutions.  Our  results  bear 
important implications which we discuss in the concluding section of the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the study of subjective well-being gained wider interest in the early nineties in 
both academia and among the public, much multi-disciplinary work, in particular in 
psychology and economics, has furthered our understanding of the sources of happiness, 
life satisfaction and other embodiments of subjective well-being.
1  
In this paper, we study to what extent formal national institutions affect people’s 
happiness, which is one of the main questions in this literature. Institutions, broadly 
defined by North (1990) as ‘the rules of the game’, regulate public and private affairs 
and could thus be expected to exert an important influence on individual well-being. For 
example, well-functioning legal systems provide and enforce property rights, insuring 
citizens against violence, theft and economic exploitation, while democratic institutions 
and  government  decentralization  provide  everyone  with  the  means  to  influence  the 
political process and resulting policy outcomes (Frey and Stutzer, 2000a; Bjørnskov, 
Dreher  and  Fischer, 2008b).  In  political  decision-making,  the  extent  of  democratic, 
institutional  constraints  on  politics,  but  also  the  relative  strength  of  political  veto 
players, might be important.
2  
At a more basic level, one would think that institutions affecting the degree of 
protection of life and property ought to clearly affect the happiness of entire populations 
                                                
1 For  an introduction into different concepts  and  measurements  of subjective well-being, see Fischer 
(2009). 
2 Indeed, the results of Henisz (2000, 2002) indicate that constraints on policy-making are associated with 
objectively better economic outcomes. A common argument is that most people are status-quo biased, 
while the presence of such constraints slows down the political reform process and prevents the ‘tyranny 
of the majority’, thus increasing the well-being of the average risk-averse individual (Alt and Lowry, 
1994; Tsebelis, 1995; König, 2001).   3
subject to the same rules and institutions. Good democratic institutions may also create 
additional ‘procedural utility’ – the outcome-independent benefit from active political 
involvement, which has been shown to substantially exceed the contribution of the pure 
allocation effect to well-being (Stutzer and Frey, 2003). 
Previous studies have investigated the effect of various measures and concepts of 
institutional quality on subjective well-being: democratic institutions and civil liberties, 
the  quality  of  legal  institutions  and  the  rule  of  law,  government  effectiveness  and 
economic  freedom,  the  existence  of  various  political  constraints  and  subsidiarity  in 
political decision-making (e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2000a; Henisz, 2000; Helliwell, 2006; 
Ovaska and Takashima, 2006; Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008a; Dorn et al., 2007, 
2008; Helliwell and Huang, 2008; Blume, Müller and Voigt, 2009). These studies have 
come to inconclusive results. As such, a growing literature has yielded few insights not 
disputed by subsequent studies.
3  
We ask what the reason for this lack of consensus may be. Previous papers may 
have come to different conclusions because they used different measures of happiness, 
different control variables, and different samples. In addition, different  studies have 
used  different  institutional  indicators  that  may  or  may  not  measure  truly  separate 
constructs (cf. Knack and Langbein, 2010). An additional problem with the previous 
                                                
3 To illustrate, the effects of political rights on life satisfaction tend to vanish in samples focusing on the 
whole  world  when  further  country-level  control  variables  are  added  (e.g.,  Schyns,  1998,  Bjørnskov, 
Dreher and Fischer, 2008a). In sub-samples of developed countries only, however, the beneficial effects 
tend to prevail (Dorn et al., 2007; Helliwell and Huang, 2008). For more examples, a  more detailed 
discussion of the literature, including transmission channels of institutions, and reasons why previous 
studies  may  have  come  to  different  results,  we  refer  to  the  working  paper  version  of  this  paper, 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2009).   4
literature is that the effect of institutional quality has been investigated in samples which 
pooled rich and poor countries. Arguably, the impact of institutions will likely differ 
among these groups of countries, with institutions providing basic needs (food, shelter, 
health  care,  education)  affecting  more  countries  at  lower  levels  of  economic 
development. The effects of political institutions, conversely, are more likely to kick in 
when a majority of the population has escaped material want.
4 
In this paper, we therefore re-investigate the impact of institutional quality on two 
measures of happiness using one common framework, namely by holding sample size 
constant, and controlling for a common set of variables. Moreover, we ask the question 
of which type of formal institutional quality matters, which we attempt to answer using 
1) an array of different institutional indicators, and 2) two new, orthogonal indicators 
derived  by  Principal  Components  Analysis.  Both  tests  are  likely  to  provide  some 
indication  as  to  which  broad  institutional  mechanisms  matter  for  happiness.  As  an 
additional way of clearing some of the confusion in the literature, we investigate the 
potentially  different  effects  of  institutions  on  happiness  for relatively  rich  and  poor 
countries separately. 
We find that the quality of formal institutions is indeed positively associated with 
happiness. Using Principal Components Analysis, the effects only slightly differ with 
respect to how aggregate happiness is defined. The analysis suggests that the effects of 
                                                
4 Relaxing the implicit assumption in most studies that the effects of institutional quality are homogenous 
across the world sample, Helliwell and Huang (2008) provide a first indication that honest and efficient 
public  service  provision  increases  happiness  in  relatively  poor  and  rich  countries,  while  political 
institutions are positively related to happiness in relatively rich  countries  only.  However, Knack  and 
Langbein  (2010)  demonstrate  that  the  indicators  used  in  Helliwell  and  Huang  (2009)  are  not 
distinguishable as separate indices.   5
economic-judicial institutions on happiness dominate those of political institutions in 
developing  countries.  In  a  sample  restricted  to  middle-  and  high-income  countries, 
however,  we  find  strong  support  for  a  beneficial  effect  of  political  institutions  in 
addition.  We  conclude  that  these  differences  might  partly  explain  the  contradictory 
results of previous studies neglecting them. 
We proceed as follows. The next section presents our indicators of institutional 
quality and reports our data and estimation method. Section 3 shows the results while 
the final section concludes and derives policy implications. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Data 
2.1.1. The dependent variable: subjective well-being 
To  measure  national  levels of  life  satisfaction,  we employ  two  different  indicators, 
based both on the survey question ”All things considered, how satisfied are you with 
your life as a whole these days?”, which respondents answer on a ten-point scale. The 
life satisfaction scores employed here are taken from all the five available waves of the 
World Values Survey (WVS, 2009), a repeated cross-section with a growing number of 
participating countries.
5  
Our first measure of happiness follows Helliwell (2006) and the approach in the 
World Database of Happiness in using the average national score on the life satisfaction 
question. As an alternative, we rely on the World Values Survey coding in using the 
percentage of  the  population  answering  in  the  top three  categories,  which  arguably 
                                                
5 First wave: 1981-1984, second wave: 1989-1993, third wave: 1994-1999, fourth wave: 1999-2004, fifth 
wave: 2005.   6
makes the measure less sensitive to cultural differences in answering at the extremes of 
the scale (following Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007). While the correlation across 
the  two  measures  is  .95,  the  country  rankings  do  change  slightly  between  these 
measures.  With  our  focus  on  institutional  determinants  of  happiness,  both  reverse 
causality and ecological fallacy are not likely to be a problem here. In particular, the 
exclusion of relevant  individual-level factors could severely bias our results if their 
inclusion resulted in different country rankings. However, to test for the presence of 
ecological  fallacy  we  calculate  the  country  fixed  effects  from  running  a  standard 
individual-level ordered probit regression (cf. Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008a), 
obtaining a measure of differences in macro happiness not pertaining to individual-level 
factors. Comparing these country fixed effects estimates with the alternative aggregate 
happiness measures employed in this study suggests that an ecological fallacy is not 
likely to be present: their correlations are .99 (for the simple average happiness) and .92 
(for the top three coding), respectively. 
  The  mean  of  life  satisfaction  in  a  country  is  usually  viewed  as  good  overall 
assessment of national happiness, but is clearly more sensitive to respondents in either 
tail  of  the  happiness  distribution,  namely  to  very  low  or  high  ranges  of  the  life 
satisfaction score, compared to the top-share. On the other hand, using the share of 
respondents  answering  in  the  top-three  categories  mitigates  some  specific  cultural 
differences in response styles that may introduce unnecessary noise when using average 
happiness (cf. Bjørnskov, 2006). We remain agnostic with respect to which measure is 
the more precise, including which measure provides a better solution to the potential   7
cardinality problem (see, e.g., Ng, 1997), since two different types of cultural response 
styles could bias the measures in opposite directions.
6 
 
2.1.2. Measures of formal institutions 
To  test  for  the  impact  of  the  quality  of  formal  institutions  on  life  satisfaction,  we 
employ a set of alternative governance measures: 1) the ‘legal quality’ index from the 
Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008); 2) the combined Gastil index of civil 
liberties and political rights  from Freedom House (2008); 3) the Polity IV  index of 
democracy from Marshall and Jaggers (2004); 4)-5) Helliwell’s (2006) two groups of 
variables relating to “the honesty and efficiency of government” and “the operation of 
the democratic process,” which may be viewed as proxy of democratic rights;
7 and 6)-
8) three indices from Henisz (2000, 2002), the first measuring the extent of constraints 
                                                
6 Bjørnskov (2006) argues that the WVS coding is more appropriate if respondents in some countries are 
averse to answering in the top category. However, if respondents are averse to answering far from the 
mean,  i.e.,  averse  to  both  ‘too’  positive  and  ‘too’  negative  answers,  resulting  in  a  mean-preserving 
cultural spread, the average measure would be more precise. As we have no way of assessing the relative 
importance of these types of biases, we proceed by tentatively interpreting the measures as if they were 
precise. We nevertheless do note that the average measure may be a more reliable measure in particularly 
poor countries, in which only a small and presumably rich part of the population is likely to respond in 
the top categories. 
7  These  variables  derive  from  Kaufmann  et  al.  (2008),  with  the  first  variable  being  the  average  of 
government  effectiveness,  regulatory  efficiency,  rule  of  law  and  lack  of  corruption,  and  the  second 
variable the average of voice and accountability, and political stability. Helliwell arrives at measures for 
1990 and 1981 by extrapolating the Kaufmann data from 1996 (the earliest observation) into the past 
(personal communication, July 22, 2009). These two highly correlated indices are also used in Helliwell 
and Huang’s (2008) analysis investigating the impact of government quality on happiness.   8
on policy-making by measuring the strength of political veto players, the second adding 
the veto-players in the judiciary and at the sub-federal level, and the third capturing the 
extent of ‘law  and order’. Except  for  the  Gastil index,  higher  values  correspond  to 
improved  institutional  quality  or  more  binding  institutional  constraints.  The  eight 
institutional measures are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Two of our legal institutions indices (‘legal quality’, ‘law and order’) capture the 
protection of property rights. While among the political institutional measures the Gastil 
index  measures  the  protection  of  political  rights  and  civil  liberties  more  broadly  –
capturing also the freedoms of speech and of association – citizens’ political rights in a 
narrow sense are reflected in the Polity IV index. The remaining indices are designed to 
measure either government effectiveness or the degree of discretion in policy-making. 
By testing these indicators against each other we hope to be able to evaluate which 
types  of governance  are  responsible  for  potential consequences on  average  national 
happiness. Descriptive statistics of the institutional variables are shown in Table 2 while 
sources are given in the Appendix. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
2.1.3. Control variables   9
In choosing our control variables, we take the specification in Helliwell (2006) as our 
starting point and supplement it by additional aggregate variables found to be important 
determinants of well-being in previous work (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007).  
The set of control variables includes an indicator of social capital: the average 
number of membership in nine different types of voluntary organizations, which in the 
tradition  of  Putnam  (2000)  aims  to  capture  social  activity  and  social  networks.  As 
measure of informal societal institutions we also employ social trust – an indicator of 
honesty  and trustworthiness  –  which  is  measured by the percentage  of  respondents 
answering ‘yes’ to the question “In general, do you think most people can be trusted?” 
Since recent studies indicate that the quality of formal institutions is affected by social 
trust, including this measure of informal institutions is arguably important as we would 
otherwise risk overestimating the importance of formal institutions (cf. Knack, 2002). 
Following Helliwell (2006), our baseline specification also includes a measure of how 
strongly people believe in god (expressed by the national percentage answering ‘yes’ to 
the question “Do you believe in a superior being”), which might also be considered as a 
type of informal institution (cf. North, 1990). We also control for the divorce rate and 
the official unemployment rate. Divorce rates  have been shown to negatively affect 
happiness  (e.g.,  Helliwell,  2006),  and  so  has  the  national  unemployment  rate  (e.g., 
DiTella et al. 2001). As the effect of economic development is highly debated in the 
happiness  literature, we also include (log) GDP per capita throughout (cf. Easterlin, 
1995). This gives us a maximum sample of 148 pooled country-year observations from 
62 countries potentially observed in either waves, namely in 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 
and 2005, for which we have full data. All countries are listed in Appendix Table A2.   10
Descriptive statistics of the control variables are shown in Table 2 while sources are 
given in the Appendix. 
 
2.1.4. Baseline model 
The  baseline  model  consists  of  the  institutional  quality  measure,  the  social  capital 
variable, the two informal institutions measures (‘social trust’ and ‘belief in god’), the 
divorce and unemployment rates, and a measure of national income. In the course of our 
analysis, this baseline model is then supplemented by a set of additional variables. First, 
we  include  dummies  for  postcommunist  countries,  Latin  America  and  Asia,  which 
previous research shows to be highly significant (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007, 
2008a). Second, we add period fixed effects to the model to take care of joint macro 
trends over time, such as business cycles, which also alleviates  some effects of the 
changing  country  composition  of  our  sample  across  waves.  Third,  we  augment  the 
model with openness to trade and the investment price level relative to the U.S., both of 
which  are  measures  of  international  integration  and  business  prospects;  in  recent 
studies, these have been found to be robustly positively associated with happiness (e.g., 
Bjørnskov,  Dreher  and  Fischer,  2007,  2008a).  As  well-working  institutions  may 
promote trade and growth (prospects) (as, e.g., the institutional reforms in China show), 




                                                
8 Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) find additional robust determinants of life satisfaction. However, 
not all are significant at conventional levels in this sample and others are only  available for a small 
number of observations. We therefore do not include these variables in the full specification, but note that 
the results reported below remain unchanged if adding the additional variables.   11
2.2. Methodology 
In  the  following,  we  estimate  the  influence  of  the  institutional  indicators  in  this 
unbalanced country-panel dataset as pooled OLS with Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSE).
9 As happiness and institutions change slowly over 
time, inclusion of country fixed effects is not advisable even though our sample spans 
up to 25 years.
10  
It  may  be  argued  that  pooling  the  data  increases  the  number  of  observations 
artificially.  Furthermore,  the  unbalanced  structure  of  the  data  gives  some  countries 
greater weight in the estimates than others. However, the main results remain when we 
weigh observations giving each country equal weight. They also remain when we use 
the 1999-cross-section only. 
Finally, to test whether the impact of institutions on happiness differs among poor 
and rich countries, we also use reduced samples of rich and poor country observations. 
The rich country-sample consists of all observations with an average GDP per capita 
above 10,000 purchasing-power parity adjusted US dollars; this sub-sample includes 96 
                                                
9 Assuming that disturbances are heteroscedastic, allowing for panel-specific  variances in unbalanced 
panels corrects for a bias in the standard errors that may otherwise inflate significance levels. Using PCSE 
thus generates more conservative estimates. 
10 In an additional set of results, we allow for an estimated first-order autoregressive disturbance, which 
equally corrects otherwise biased standard errors. Given that institutions change slowly over time, even 
with a time gap of 5 years or more across waves the assumption of first-order autocorrelation is justified. 
We do not report these estimates in the following as all results are robust to allowing for autocorrelation; 
however, these results are available on request. The same holds for a set of fixed effects regressions 
which employs an alternative, more volatile measure of national happiness. Although all results are less 
significant in the fixed effects specification, as one would expect in a small sample, these results also 
provide significant support for our main findings.   12
country-year observations from 31 countries. We chose a threshold level of 10,000 USD 
as it is approximately the level at which most studies find average income to cease 
being  associated  with  subjective  well-being,  excluding  roughly  one  third  of  all 
observations and countries (Schyns, 1998; Dolan, Peasgood and White, 2008).
11 The 
sample containing poor countries only consists of all observations with GDP per capita 
below 20,000 US dollars, thereby making it of the same size as the subsample with rich 
countries, i.e., a sample size that is empirically practicable.
12 With both samples, the 
relevant comparison group is therefore the set of middle-income countries. All results 
are reported for both happiness measures using the full sample and the sub-samples of 
rich and poor countries. 
 
3. Results 
As a first simple way of illustrating the potential effects of institutional quality on life 
satisfaction, as well as demonstrating the difficulty in separating institutional measures, 
Table 3 reports the simple and partial correlations (controlling for GDP) between the 
institutional variables as well as their correlations with the two measures of national 
happiness.  First  of  all,  the  table  illustrates  the  difficulty  in  separating  different 
institutional characteristics, as most indices are highly related. The relative exceptions 
are  the  Polity  IV  index  and  the  two  political  constraints  indicators  that  are  more 
                                                
11 When splitting the sample at what may seem a somewhat arbitrary level of USD 10,000, it should be 
noted that all results remain qualitatively unchanged when we apply other cut-offs of, e.g., USD 9,000 or 
11,000. As such, the subsample results in the following do not depend on the specific cut-off chosen here. 
12 As we are operating near the limit at which panel estimates make sense, we have had to go for a larger 
sample, which necessitates that we allow for partially overlapping samples. While a clean cut-off would 
be ideally preferable, it is not practicable with these data.   13
moderately  correlated  with  the  remaining  institutional  indices.  However,  it  is  worth 
noting that a relatively large share of rich countries scores a perfect 10 on the Polity IV 
index, which is therefore effectively right-censored.
13 Second, the partial correlations 
also show that controlling for joint variation due to GDP per capita (which is highly 
correlated  with  institutional  quality)  reduces  some  of  the  correlations  among  the 
institutional measures and thus makes  it potentially easier to separate the effects of 
single institutional measures on happiness. In other words, part of the identification 
problem  seems  to  lie  in  economic  development  confounding  relations  between 
institutional indices. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. First, we replicate the results in 
Helliwell (2006) for our two measures of happiness – based on constant samples of 
countries – thereby testing the robustness of previous results to the choice of dependent 
variable. We then add additional control variables to see whether these first results arise 
from omitted variables bias. Second, we employ the different indicators of institutional 
quality  introduced  above  to  test  which  dimension  of  institutional  quality  is  most 
robustly linked to happiness. Finally, we report the results of Principal Components 
Analysis, deriving two main dimensions of institutional quality, and relating them to 
happiness. 
                                                
13 It is also well known that most countries tend to fare better on the Polity IV index of democracy than on 
the  alternative  Gastil  index  of  political  rights  and  civil  liberties  or  Henisz’s  (2000)  measures.  As 
explained in the previous section, the reason is that the latter two indices apply a broader concept of 
democracy that also entails civil rights (like, e.g., economic freedom).   14
  Column 1 of Table 4 replicates Helliwell’s (2006) results using the ‘honest and 
efficient government’ indicator and his original specification (thus excluding period and 
region  dummies) with  average  national  happiness  as  dependent  variable.  Column  5 
instead reports the results when the share of respondents in the top three categories is 
employed as dependent variable instead. 
As the estimates in these columns show, in the baseline specification our variable 
of main interest, government efficiency, increases national happiness according to both 
definitions  of  happiness,  with  a  coefficient  significant  at  the  one  percent  level.  As 
regards the control variables, their effects are equally qualitatively identical across the 
two definitions  of  well-being.  Contrasting  Helliwell  (2006),  however, the effects  of 
social networks (‘average memberships’) are not robust to using our larger sample. At 
least at the five percent level, and in support of Helliwell (2006), we find that social 
trust, believing  in god, and economic development increase average and ‘top three’ 
well-being, while divorce and unemployment rates reduce it. 
The model extensions are reported in columns 2 and 6. They add a dummy for 
postcommunist countries and the regional dummies for Asia and Latin America, period 
dummies, and two variables – trade openness and the investment price level – that are 
arguably correlated with efficient government institutions.
14 Columns 3 and 7 exclude 
poor countries from the regression sample while columns 4 and 8 exclude relatively rich 
                                                
14 As the tables show, the introduction of regional dummies substantially improves the statistical fit. With 
respect to these variables, it is worth mentioning that people in Latin American countries, in particular, 
are happier than the average. The difference to the rest of the world, all other things held constant, is 
+0.44 points on the average measure and +5.6 percentage points when using the WVS coding. A working 
paper version of this paper (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2009) provides further evidence showing the 
influence of the separate inclusion of regional dummies and additional variables.   15
countries. Again, we hold the samples constant across the table so that the observed 
differences  are  exclusively  due  to differences  caused  by  the  additional  explanatory 
variables included in the model and to how we measure happiness. 
Across  our  models  and  the  two  happiness  measures,  some  minor  differences 
emerge  for  the  control  variables:  According  to  the  results  for  the  average  coding 
reported on the lefthand side of the table, membership in voluntary organizations is 
significant at the ten percent level in only relatively poor countries, and only for the 
average measure of happiness. In contrast, the  unemployment rate no longer affects 
average happiness according to columns 2-4 but still reduces well-being when focusing 
on the share of happiest in the population.
15 While the effects of the divorce rate are 
robust when using the average coding, the coefficient is not significant in any of the 
additional regressions when using the top three coding (columns 6-8). Not surprisingly, 
per capita GDP loses significance when focusing on the top three coding in the more 
homogenous group of rich countries.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                
15 We can only speculate on why unemployment becomes insignificant when using the average measure 
of happiness. Possibly, this finding indicates a social norm effect (cf. Clark, Knabe and Raetzel, 2008). 
However, it also seems a priori likely that unemployment mainly moves people out of the bottom of the 
top  categories  and  into  a  lower  category,  thus  only  affecting  the  happiness  average  marginally,  but 
emerging  clearly  in  the  alternative  measure.  We  also  note  that  the  effects  of  unemployment  and 
membership are substantially weakened when period fixed effects are added. As such, due to our data 
covering more periods, this effect seems to reflect that these factors tend to follow a joint, international 
business cycle.   16
Turning  to  our  variable  of  interest  –  the  effects  of  honest  and  efficient 
governments – we basically replicate Helliwell’s (2006) main findings when keeping to 
his specification, regardless of how the dependent variable is defined. When using the 
average coding,  the  result  equally  remains  when  adding the extra  control  variables, 
which is not the case when employing the population share of the happiest people: in 
column 7, institutional quality is significant at the ten percent level only, while it is no 
longer significant at conventional levels in column 8. The decrease in coefficient size of 
the  ‘efficient  government’  estimates  suggests  that  government  efficiency  varies 
systematically across world regions, but rather not over time, and that it is associated 
with increased trade openness and positive business prospects, as we conjectured.  
Overall, there hence seems to be some support for the importance of institutional 
quality on happiness when using the average measure of population well-being. The 
results in both tables nevertheless indicate that the simple models of columns 1 and 5 
overestimate the effects of formal institutions. Calculating elasticities, the results show 
that  the  beta  coefficient  reduced  by  more  than  half  when  including  the  additional 
relevant control variables. 
Taken all together, in the extended models, quality of both formal and informal 
institutional quality still appears to be conducive to people’s life satisfaction in rich 
countries. However, while the effects of social trust and belief  in god are robust to 
varying model specifications, this is not the case for the effect of ‘honest and efficient 
governments’: it is not robust to the choice of happiness measure, particularly when 
economic covariates are added to the model. Using the average coding, which both 
includes changes away from misery (the bottom of the happiness distribution) as well as 
changes towards actual happiness (the top of the distribution), a one-standard deviation   17
shock to formal institutions induces an improvement in happiness of approximately one 
fourth of a standard deviation while a shock of similar size to trust results in a similar 
improvement in happiness.  
Arguably, a main critique one could direct against the results in Table 4 is that, as 
various measures of governance are strongly correlated and one indicator of institutional 
quality might just proxy for another, they do not inform about which type of formal 
institutions matters. 
To  test  for  the  potential  importance  of  the  broader  number  of  alternative 
institutional indicators as used in the previous literature and summarized in Table 1, we 
employ the (new) baseline of columns 2 and 5 in the previous table (which includes 
period dummies, regional dummies, and all economic factors), again focusing on the 
same set  of  country observations.  Specifically,  we  replace  the ‘honest and  efficient 
government’ indicator by one other institutional index at the time to test which of them 
is most robustly related to well-being. Again, we also report results for subsamples 
restricted to richer and poorer countries. 
Table 5 summarizes the results of testing the strength of the institutional indicators 
against each other. For all eight indices, respectively, one additional index of the seven 
remaining  ones  was  added  at  the  time  to  the  regressions.  Table  5  then  reports  the 
number of instances out of seven in which the index remains significant at conventional 
levels of significance. As such, the results can indicate the relative strength of each 
institutional  indicator.  For  both  life  satisfaction  measures,  democratic  process  quite 
clearly dominates in the total sample, always being significant at the five percent level 
at least. However, quite strong results are also obtained for legal quality and the Gastil 
index. For the rich country sample it is less clear which index dominates as the Political   18
Constraints III measure also remains significant at conventional levels in most cases. 
For the poor country sample, legal quality is the most robust measure, with democratic 
process second and all other indicators failing all tests with at least one of the happiness 
measures. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Overall, in Table 5 the evidence on the effects of formal institutions on happiness 
remains mixed and rather inconclusive. First, the fairly robust impact of democratic 
process and legal quality across the two different definitions of happiness and the two 
sample sizes is quite striking. On the other hand, for the richer countries the overall 
picture looks different where both measures of legal quality, the Gastil index of civil 
liberties, the democratic process measure, and Political Constraints III are reasonably 
robust.  
With respect to the Polity IV index, in particular, it must be stressed that there is 
rather little variation in these indices at the top of the global income distribution. As 
such, their profiles tend to follow the pattern of the effects of economic development on 
happiness.  In other words, the specific relation  between these indices and GDP per 
capita implies that they are relatively likely to pick up the non-linear relation between 
average income and happiness documented in other studies (cf. Schyns, 1998). Seen in 
the light of this feature, the relative strength of the Gastil index may be more remarkable 
as it measures the status of both economic-judicial and political institutions, resulting in   19
much larger variation compared to the more narrowly defined Polity IV democracy 
measure.
16 
  As the results in Table 5 suggest, it is difficult to separate the effects of different 
indices of formal institutions on happiness since they are highly correlated – as shown 
in Table 3 – and strongly related to economic development (cf. Paldam and Gundlach, 
in press). As recent evidence suggests that many governance indices may measure the 
same underlying construct (c.f., Knack and Langbein, 2010), we therefore perform the 
following simple three-step test in addition to the standard analysis: 1) we first follow 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) in calculating  the residuals of regressing the eight 
indicators  on  (log)  GDP  per  capita,  thereby  taking  out  most  joint  variation  due  to 
economic development, and leaving only variation that is strictly institutional instead of 
following from economic capacity (see also Hicken, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2005); 2) 
we use these residuals as if they were precise measures of institutions in a principal 
components analysis (Table A3 in the Appendix reports the specifics of this analysis); 
and 3) we rerun the analyses above using the component solution of the analysis. As 
such, this procedure has the double advantage that most variation caused by economic 
development  is  excluded  from  the  resulting  indices,  and  that  these  indices  are 
orthogonal by construction. Problems due to joint variation hidden in most indices of 
institutional quality that would prevent identification of differential effects of different 
types of institutions are thus alleviated. 
                                                
16 Indeed, splitting the Gastil index in political rights and civil liberties shows that the variation of the full 
index across the richer countries is driven by civil liberties, mirroring the invariance of the more narrowly 
defined Polity IV index.   20
First  of  all,  the  principal  components  analysis  supports  the  existence  of  two 
orthogonal  components  that  can  be  readily  interpreted  as  a  political  institutions 
component and a component capturing the quality of economic and judicial institutions 
(see Table A3), corroborating the differential findings of Table 5. As such, the results 
are broadly consistent with the similar analysis in Munck and Verkuilen (2002) who 
find two broadly similar institutional dimensions.  
Using these two scores – which we term ‘political factor’ and ‘economic factor’ – 
in place of the primary indices therefore should provide more precise estimates on the 
importance  of  the  two  separate  institutional  types  for  happiness  compared  to  the 
analyses above. As Table 6 quite clearly shows, this actually is the case. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The  results  in  Table  6  document  a  positive  effect  of  economic-judicial  and 
political institutions for both measures of life satisfaction, in the full sample and both 
subsamples  alike.  However,  for  either  measure  of  life  satisfaction,  the  one  of  the 
dimensions of institutional quality is clearly stronger when excluding relatively poor 
countries. Our results indicate that whenever countries have reached a certain level of 
economic development, the institutions of democratic political decision-making may be 
beneficial for overall national happiness. In contrast, the development of factors such as 
a fair and efficient legal system affects citizens’ average happiness in poor countries   21
too,  but  not  happiness  when  coded  as  the  top  three  percentage.
17  The  last  section 
summarizes and discusses the significance of the full set of findings. 
 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
What  contributes  to  happiness,  and  whether  national  happiness  can  be  altered  has 
recently  become  a  key  topic  in  the  new  literature  on  happiness  within  economics. 
However, many empirical findings have been conflicting, not least those pertaining to 
the  potential  influence  of  institutional  quality.  This  paper  looks  closer  into  the 
association between the quality of formal institutions and national happiness, paying 
specific attention to the differential effects of different types and different indicators of 
institutional quality. Particularly, we have estimated the potential influence of formal 
institutions by applying eight different indicators of institutional quality and governance 
to  a  constant  set  of  countries.  In  addition,  we  have  taken  account  of  the  strong 
correlation among measures of institutional quality by deriving factor scores, which 
yielded  two  separate  dimensions  of  good  governance  capturing  economic-judicial 
quality and political influence. Finally, we took account of the differential impact of 
institutional quality on happiness in low as compared to high income countries. 
Overall,  when  employing  the  traditional  institutional  indicators,  our  results 
support the existence of a positive effect of institutions on average national happiness, 
                                                
17  It  should  be  stressed  that  due  to  the  well  established  association  between  income  and  individual 
subjective wellbeing, the top three share is more likely to capture the average happiness of a relative elite 
in particularly poor countries. In contrast, in relatively richer countries, it is likely to be a better measure 
of the happiness of the population at large. To the extent that this holds for most poor countries, we must 
consider the average measure as a more valid measure of happiness within these countries, all other things 
being equal.   22
but  also  illustrate  the  difficulty  in  separating  different  types  and  dimensions  of 
institutional  quality.  To  resolve  this  problem,  we  use  two  measures  of  institutional 
quality  constructed  with  factor  analysis.  We  thereby  alleviate  the  problem  of 
conceptually and empirically separating different indicators, as outlined by Knack and 
Langbein (2010). This provides  some  support for the existence  of  two independent 
effects  –  that  of  overall  economic-judicial  and  that  of  political  institutions.  The 
economic-judicial  type  seems  to  dominate  the  political  institutions  type  when  a 
sufficient number of developing countries enter the sample, while analyses restricted to 
middle- and high-income countries show an additional strong support for a beneficial 
effect of the political institutions type. This finding is in line with Dorn et al. (2007) and 
Helliwell and Huang (2008), both showing that democracy contributes to happiness in 
cross-sections of richer countries.  
Overall,  our  factor  score  analysis  indicates  a  robust  and  positive  association 
between the quality of formal economic-judicial and political institutions, and national 
happiness. The size of these effects, measured as the change induced in happiness from 
a one-standard deviation change in institutional quality, vary between one sixth and one 
third of a standard deviation. Using the average measure of happiness, marginal effects 
are substantially larger for the subsample of richer countries than for comparatively 
poor countries, and are therefore of economic and social significance.  
However, following the traditional happiness literature (e.g., Helliwell 2003), we 
do not estimate  the  unconditional  effects  of  institutions, but confine  the  analysis  to 
partial  effects,  controlling  for  some  of  the  potential  transmission  channels  –  most 
notably  economic  well-being  and  trade.  While  economic  transmission  channels  are 
comparably easy to account for, with an international country panel like ours there are   23
no  consistent  measures  of  government  activities,  procedural  utility  or  even 
‘entertainment through politics’. This leaves us with the still unresolved question of 
what  the  potentially  mediating  factors  may  be  and  a  set  of  relatively  conservative 
estimates of the importance of institutions for happiness. 
Another critique one may raise is the rather unresolved question of causality – do 
happy citizens choose democratic structures while the unhappy prefer to be lead by a 
‘strong single man’? Here, we follow the previous literature arguing that the relatively 
larger  stability  of  institutions  over  time  compared  to  the  more  volatile  happiness 
measure makes reversed causality unlikely (e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2000, Dorn et al. 
2008). Moreover, we found the effects of the institutional factor scores to be robust in a 
fixed effects  framework that controls for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, 
thus mitigating potential biases trough endogeneity and omitted variables.  
Our results suggest that citizens may derive subjective well-being from having 
democratic political institutions whenever the bulk of the population has escaped real 
(absolute)  poverty.  Yet,  before  that  goal  has  been  reached,  only  economic-judicial 
institutions  protecting  life,  ensuring  property  rights  and  providing  economic 
opportunities  contribute  to  average  happiness.  This  type  of  institutions  may 
simultaneously  also  fuel  economic  growth  (cf.  Knack  and  Keefer,  1995;  Berggren, 
2003;  Engerman  and  Sokoloff,  2008).  From  a  methodological  point  of  view,  our 
empirical findings suggest that part of the controversy in the literature may simply stem 
from the systematic parameter heterogeneity of the institutional estimates that may have 
biased full-sample estimates towards zero in most large-sample studies. In other words, 
at a basic level, the results suggest that institutions protecting life and property – the 
economic-judicial  institutions  –  are  associated  with  happiness  at  most  levels  of   24
development. Political institutions are more likely to be related to valuing influence and 
being able to express ones opinion freely. 
Whether our findings hold any policy implications or not is the final question to be 
touched upon. We explicitly do not discuss whether governments should attempt to 
follow such implications – a question which Frey and Stutzer (2000b) address at length 
– but only whether the findings hold potential implications. 
First,  the  results  indicate  that  the  strength  of  legal  quality  is  associated  with 
happiness. One of the potential ways to raise national happiness would thus seem to be 
to invest in a fair and efficient legal system and to allow for economic opportunities in 
poor  and  rich  countries  alike,  as  indicated  by  Ovaska  and  Takashima  (2006).  An 
additional side-benefit of such an approach would also be higher economic growth as 
suggested by the vast literature on the topic. However, the everlasting problem remains 
how  to  implement  a  fair  and  efficient  legal  system  in  which  citizens  can  have 
confidence. 
Second, our findings suggest that democratization would in general be beneficial 
for  national  happiness  when  countries  have  reached  a  certain  level  of  economic 
development at which most basic needs are met for the majority of the population. 
Indeed, the democracy  literature  suggests that democratization  becomes  more likely 
when countries surpass some level of economic development (Lipset, 1959; Paldam, 
2007). That might imply that we should not expect a beneficial effect of attempts by the 
international community to impose democracy from the outside in poor, disorganized, 
and socially unstable countries. The results of the literature on development aid but also 
the current ‘failures’ in Iraq and Afghanistan show that such efforts have been at best 
ineffective (e.g., Knack, 2004).    25
At the end of the day, we are therefore left with a set of findings that entail rather 
difficult  implications.  Fair  and  efficient  judicial systems seem  to  contribute to both 
happiness and economic development, but the literature also suggests that institutional 
quality cannot simply be transplanted or copied from other countries. For middle and 
high-income  countries,  this  paper  shows  that  the  existence  of  democratic  political 
institutions is also positively associated with happiness. The restriction of the effect of 
such institutions in richer countries, fortunately, represents only a minor problem, as 
most studies find that democracy tends to emerge when countries reach a certain level 
of  economic  development, and  citizens  begin to demand political influence  (Lipset, 
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Table 1. Institutional measures 
Name  Source  Description 





Overall measure of the quality and capacity of the legal system, 
consisting of indices of judicial independence, impartiality of the 
courts, protection of intellectual property rights, military 
interference in law and politics, and integrity of the legal system. 
Gastil index  Freedom 
House 
(2008) 
Index capturing the existence of political rights and civil liberties; 
lower scores mean better protection of rights and liberties. 
Polity IV index  Marshall and 
Jaggers 
(2004) 
Index intended to capture three essential elements of democracy: 1) 
institutions and procedures enabling citizens to freely express their 
preferences for policies and leaders; 2) effective constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive; and 3) the civil liberties of 





Average of rule of law, regulatory quality, bureaucratic efficiency 





Average of political stability and voice and accountability indices 





Index capturing constraints on the feasibility of policy change, 
defined as the degree to which a change in the preferences of one or 
more political actors is permitted to affect government policy. The 






Index employing the same data and logic as Political constraints III, 
but adding veto points within the judiciary and sub-federal entities. 
Law and order  Henisz 
(2000, 2002) 
Law and Order index from Political Risk Services (1996). Higher 
scores imply “a strong law and order tradition;” lower score mean “a 
tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to setting 
claims.” 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Standard deviation  Observations 
Life satisfaction, average  6.989  .956  149 
Life satisfaction, top three  48.942  17.599  149 
Average memberships  .429  .313  149 
Social trust  .316  .152  149 
Belief in god  .417  .267  149 
Divorce rate  1.832  1.112  149 
Unemployment rate  8.352  4.669  149 
Postcommunist  .228  .421  149 
Openness to trade  74.936  47.680  149 
Investment price level  83.601  30.392  149 
GDP per capita  16,607  8,527  149 
      149 
Legal quality  7.005  1.571  149 
Gastil index  1.985  1.287  149 
Polity IV index  7.763  4.041  149 
Honest and efficient government  .928  .892  149 
Democratic process  .789  .679  149 
Political contraints III  .442  .142  149 
Political contraints V  .698  .187  149 
Law and order  4.752  1.204  149 
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Table 3. Correlations between life satisfaction and institutional measures 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1. Honest and efficient 
government 


















































6. Political constraints 
III 




7. Political constraints V              1  .65 
(.48) 
8. Law and order                1 
                 
Average happiness  .66  .56  .53  -.48  .35  .21  .29  .39 
Top three happiness  .65  .57  .53  -.49  .39  .23  .28  .41 
Note: partial correlations in parentheses, controlling for GDP per capita. 
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Table 4. Basic results 
  Average coding  Top three coding 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
.229  .248*  -.015  .343*  3.336  1.399  -4.211  4.639  Average memberships 
(.155)  (.145)  (.179)  (.191)  (3.067)  (2.913)  (3.923)  (3.606) 
2.056***  1.850***  1.568***  2.413***  44.110***  44.855***  41.918***  56.042***  Social trust 
(382)  (.358)  (.382)  (.617)  (7.707)  (7.324)  (8.495)  (12.305) 
1.751***  1.014***  .867***  1.444***  31.035***  17.329***  13.539**  28.563***  Belief in god 
(.229)  (.254)  (.239)  (.334)  (4.481)  (4.798)  (5.349)  (6.040) 
-.242***  -.126***  -.114**  -.133**  -2.646***  -.747  -.118  -.835  Divorce rate 
(.049)  (.042)  (.053)  (.053)  (.921)  (.769)  (1.101)  (.857) 
-.022**  -.011  -.004  -.011  -.454**  -.388**  -.502*  -.393*  Unemployment rate 
(.009)  (.009)  (.012)  (.010)  (.196)  (.183)  (.278)  (.206) 
Log GDP per capita  .425***  .380**  .482**  .625***  6.859**  6.312**  5.972  12.382*** 
  (.137)  (.153)  (.218)  (.177)  (2.664)  (2.929)  (5.294)  (3.311) 
  -.502**  -.272  -.368    -9.689**  -8.083  -6.425  Postcommunist 
  (.206)  (.271)  (.232)    (3.842)  (5.776)  (4.458) 
Openness to trade    .002**  .002**  .004**    .061***  .062***  .077*** 
    (.001)  (.001)  (.001)    (.018)  (.020)  (.023) 
.005***    .089***  .089***  .105***  Investment price level    .004*** 
(.001) 
.004* 
(.002)  (.001)    (.025)  (.057)  (.030) 
.477***  .265**  .342**  .229*  7.894***  3.062  4.697*  1.364  Honest and efficient 
government  (.111)  (.111)  (.151)  (.118)  (2.137)  (2.075)  (2.671)  (2.075) 
Regional dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Period dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample  All  All  GDP>10,000  GDP<20,000  All  All  GDP>10,000  GDP<20,000 
Observations  148  148  96  96  148  148  96  96 
Countries  62  62  36  54  62  62  36  54 
R squared  .707  .802  .757  .810  .645  .769  .754  .762 
Wald Chi squared  360.42  613.45  299.75  540.83  392.75  638.78  333.49  521.39 
Note: estimation is with pooled OLS; panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. “Average” is the 
country’s mean in life satisfaction while “Top three” is the country’s population share of those reporting in the highest three categories of life satisfaction..    35
Table 5. Which indicators are robust? 
   Average  Top three 
   All  GDP>10,000  GDP<20,000  All  GDP>10,000  GDP<20,000 
Legal quality  6  6  7  5  5  6 
Gastil index  4  7  0  5  6  4 
Polity IV index  1  3  0  5  4  5 
Honest and efficient 
government 
4  3  4  0  0  0 
Democratic process  7  7  6  7  7  4 
Law and order  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Political constraints 
III 
0  5  0  0  6  0 
Political constraints 
V 
0  4  0  0  1  0 
Note: The numbers count the instances in which the indicator remains significant at p<.05 when one other 
indicator is added at the time to the regressions reported in column 5 of tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
“Average” is the country’s mean in life satisfaction, while “Top three” denotes the population share of 
those reporting in the highest three categories of life satisfaction. 
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Table 6. Testing types of institutions 
   Average  Top three 
   All  GDP>10,000  GDP<20,000  All  GDP>10,000  GDP<20,000 
.204***  .279***  .175**  2.468**  3.737***  1.249  Economic 
factor  (.065)  (.071)  (.071)  (1.194)  (1.348)  (1.275) 
.109**  .253***  .055  2.712***  4.956***  1.998*  Political 
factor  (.053)  (.073)  (.059)  (.943)  (1.531)  (1.089) 
Observations  148  96  96  148  96  96 
Countries  62  36  54  62  36  54 
R squared  .815  .814  .817  .787  .794  .773 
Wald chi2  622.08  475.49  537.19  617.19  554.70  483.67 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; 
all regressions include the baseline variables. “Average” is the country’s mean in life satisfaction, while 
“Top three” denotes the population share of those reporting in the highest three categories of life 
satisfaction. 
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Table A1. Data sources 
Variable  Source  Measured as 









Social trust  Population percentage 
Belief in god 
World Values Survey (2009) 
Population percentage 
Divorce rate  Share of marriages 
Unemployment rate 
World Bank (2007) 
Share of active labor 
force 
Postcommunist    0 (no) / 1(yes) 
Openness to trade  Share of GDP 
Investment price 
level 
Investment price level 
relative to US 
investment price level 
GDP per capita 
Penn World Tables, Mark 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006) 
ppp adjusted US 
dollars 
Legal quality  The Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008)  0 (low) to 10 (high) 
Gastil index  Freedom House (2008)  1(high) to 7 (low) 
Polity IV index  Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004)  0 (low) to 10 (high) 
Honest and efficient 
government 
Helliwell (2006)  -2.5 to 2.5 
Democratic process  Helliwell (2006)  -2.5 to 2.5 
Law and order  Henisz (2000)  0 to .74 
Polcon III  Henisz (2002)  0 to .89 
Polcon V  Henisz (2000)  2 to 6 
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Table A2. Countries included in the study 
Albania (1999)  Hungary (1990)  Russia (1990) 
Argentina (1981)  Iceland (1981)  Serbia (2005) 
Australia (1981)  Indonesia (2005)  Singapore (1999) 
Austria (1990)  Ireland (1981)  Slovak Republic (1999) 
Belgium (1981)  Italy (1981)  Slovenia (1990) 
Brazil (1990)  Japan (1981)  South Africa (2005) 
Bulgaria (1990)  Jordan (2005)  South Korea (1990) 
Canada (1981)  Latvia (1990)  Spain (1981) 
Chile (1990)  Lithuania (1990)  Sweden (1981) 
Croatia (1995)  Luxembourg (1999)  Switzerland (1990) 
Cyprus (2005)  Malta (1999)  Taiwan (2005) 
Czech Republic (1995)  Mexico (1981)  Thailand (2005) 
Denmark (1981)  Moldova (1999)  Trinidad and Tobago (2005) 
Dominican Republic (1995)  Morocco (2005)  Turkey (2005) 
Egypt (2005)  Netherlands (1981)  Ukraine (1995) 
El Salvador (1999)  New Zealand (1999)  United Kingdom (1981) 
Estonia (1990)  Norway (1981)  United States (1981) 
Finland (1990)  Peru (1995)  Uruguay (1995) 
France (1981)  Poland (1990)  Venezuela (1995) 
Germany (1981)  Portugal (1990)  Vietnam (2005) 
Greece (1999)  Romania (1990)   
Note: countries in italics are those with at least one observation with a GDP per capita above 10,000 
USD. Numbers in parentheses are the first year in which the country has an observation. 
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Table A3. Principal components analysis 
Variable  Economic factor  Political factor  Uniqueness 
Honest and efficient government  .836  .136  .267 
Democratic process  .787  .319  .257 
Legal quality  .657  .008  .455 
Gastil index  -.289  -.869  .154 
Polity IV  .004  .883  .207 
Law and order  .514  .019  .530 
Polcon III  .187  .387  .571 
Polcon V  .371  .277  .411 
Eigenvalue  3.392  1.284   
Variance explained  .491  .407   
Note: component loadings have been rotated. 
 
  
 